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Abstract
The increasing amount of network throughput and security threat makes
intrusiondetectiona major research problem. In the literature, intrusion detection
has been approached by either a hardware or software technique. This work
reviews and compares hardware based techniques that are commonly used in
intrusion detection systems (IDS) with a special emphasis on modern hardware
platforms such as FPGA, GPU, MCPandASIC.
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Introduction
The IDSs can be divided based on the detection approach into two categories:
anomaly, and signature based detection. Table 1 shows a comparison between
these approaches.
TABLE 1 : A COMPARISON BETWEEN IDS DETECTION APPROACHES
The IDS gathers, observes and collects data before the analysis phase using
different strategies. These include: host-based and network-based strategies.
The Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) requires pattern matching,
string matching, multimatch packet classification, and a regular expression
matching to perform its functions. The utmost reason for shifting from
software to hardware is to enable real-time implementation of IDS. A
hardware-based intrusion detection system is a scalable method as it is able to
inspect packets in high speed networks. We have taken a glance at earlier
hardware techniques platforms. Table 2 presents a comparison among
hardware platform solutions that include Processor, FPGA, and
ASIC. Ternary content addressable memory (TCAM) devices are
also widely used in NIDS (Figure 1).
TABLE 2 : COMPARISON AMONG HARDWARE PLATFORM SOLUTIONS
Figure 3. Implementation of “(a|b|c|d)” RegExp.
Packet Classification - Hardware-Based Techniques
Various multi-match packet classification solutions have been introduced. Table 5 shows a comparison of
the hardware-based packet classification NIDS techniques. Figure 4 illustrates the main process of
packet classification.
TABLE 5 :  COMPARISON OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE STATE OF THE ART HARDWARE SOLUTIONS FOR MULTI-MATCH PACKET CLASSIFICATION IN NIDS
Network Intrusion Detection Using Hardware 
Techniques: A Review
.
Authors Algorithm Platform Throughput Gbps Storage Power mW SNORT
Song BV-TCAM FPGA 10 73.8 17.7 No
Fang TCAM-SSA TCAM 20 13 312 No
Faezipour MX-MN-IP TCAM 80 13 296 No
Regular Expression Matching- Hardware-Based 
Techniques 
A basic regular expression (Regex) matching engine can be implemented in hardware as
a state machine, either a deterministic finite machine or a non-deterministic finite
machine. Figure 3 shows the implementation of sample regular expression engine in
hardware. Table 4 presents a sample of hardware-based Regex solutions in the literature.
TABLE 4 : COMPARISON OF THE MOST COMMON HARDWARE-BASED REGULAR EXPRESSION MATCHING ENGINE PERFORMANCE SOLUTIONS
Authors Approach Non-Meta Chars Number of  LUT 
per state
Multi-Char Per 
Cycle
Throughput (Gbps)
Clark et al. FPGA 17,537 3.1 4 73.8
Sourdis et al FPGA 69,127 0.66 1 2.42
Yamagaki et al FPGA 40,896 0.94 4 3.63
Bispo et al. FPGA 19,580 1.28 1 2.9
Processors ASIC FPGA
Can enhance the aggregate throughput
dramatically by using parallel processing
Approach
Provide impressively high per-stream
throughput
Provide desirable high performance ,flexibility of
software and reconfigurable programming
Additional Complexity is introduced in
scheduling ,buffering ordering, and load
balancing
The applicability is limited by the high
implementation cost and low re-
programmability
It takes considerable time to resynthesize the
design and reprogram the FPGA device
Conclusion
The application of hardware for intrusion detection systems has become an active area of research with
the support of the modern powerful hardware devices such as FPGA, ASIC, Multicore processor and
GPU. However, hardware-based techniques might face real performance challenges due to multiple
factors that may affect the implementations of these techniques such as the fiercely rising demands to
handle higher traffic rates, analysis, real-time operation, power consumption, memory requirements and
the collapse of Moore’s lawfor sequential processing.
References
1. M. Whitman, and H. Mattord, Principles of information security. 4th Ed, Boston: Cengage Learning. 2011
2. R. Bhatnagar, and U. Shankar, “The proposal of hybrid intrusion detection for defense of sync flood attack in wireless sensor network,” Int. J. 
Comput.Sci and Eng. Surveys, vol. 3, no 2, pp 31-38, Apr.2012.
3. D. E. Culler, A. Gupta, and J. P. Singh, Parallel Computer Architecture: A Hardware/Software Approach. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., 1997
4. P. Hunter, “Hardware-based security: FPGA-based devices,” Computer Fraud & Security, vol. 2004, no. 2, pp. 11–12, 2004
5. H. Chen, Y. Chen, and  D. H. Summerville, "A Survey on the Application of FPGAs for Network Infrastructure Security," IEEE Commun. Surveys 
Tutorials, vol.13, no.4, pp.541-561, 2011
6. Yamagaki, N., Sidhu, R., and Kamiya, S. (2008, September). High-speed regular expression matching engine using multi-character NFA. In Field 
Programmable Logic and Applications, 2008. FPL 2008. International Conference on (pp. 131-136). IEEE.
7. G. Diana, D. Marco, M.P Joao, and  B. Koen, “Reconfigurable Computing: Architectures, Tools, and Applications,”: 10th Int. Symp., ARC 2014, 
Vilamoura, Portugal, April 14-16, 2014.
8. M. Faezipour, M. Nourani, "Wire-Speed TCAM-Based Architectures for Multimatch Packet Classification," IEEE Trans. Comput., vol.58, no.1, 
pp.5-17, Jan. 2009
9. Jiang, Weirong, and Viktor K. Prasanna. "Field-split parallel architecture for high performance multi-match packet classification using 
FPGAs."Proceedings of the twenty-first annual symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures. ACM, 2009.
10. Z.K. Baker, and V.K. Prasanna, "Automatic Synthesis of Efficient Intrusion Detection Systems on FPGAs", IEEE Trans.on Dependable and Secure 
Computing, vol.3, no.4, pp.289-300, Oct.-Dec. 2006.
Author Plat form Analysis time Audit material Audit Features
Pontarelli FPGA Real time Network-Based UDP Packets,TCP Packets
Quang FPGA Real time
Network-Based IP , Port ,Packets, Octets, Start Time, 
End Time, Flags
Jaic FPGA Real time Network-Based Packet payload
Xia GPU Offline Network-Based TCP/IP  packet  header features
Kim GPU Offline Network-Based Packet  payloads
Jamshed GPU Real time Host-Based Packet  payloads
Jaehyun MultiCore Processors Offline Network-Based Packet  payloads
Das FPGA Real time Network-Based Packet payload
Criteria Anomaly-Based Signature-Based
Update No Yes
Detection ability Both Known and unknown attacks Only Known attacks with very high accuracy
Definition Use deviation from normal usagepattern to identify intrusions Use patterns of well-known attacks to identify intrusions
Feature of the system High False Alarm Low False Alarm
Implementation requirement Requires less computation andresources Requires more computation and resources
Hardware-Based Intrusion Detection Systems
Table 6presents a sample of available Hardware-based NIDS in the literature.
TABLE 6 : CLASSIFICATION OF NIDS BASED ON HARDWARE SOLUTION PLATFORMS.
Figure. 1. Typical TCAM device
String and Pattern Matching - Hardware-
Based Techniques 
The most common method to implement pattern matching in hardware is to
use Finite Automata (FA) approaches. Finite Automata (FA) are either
Deterministic Finite Automata (DFA) or Non-Deterministic finite automata
(NFA). Table 3 presents a sample of the literature. Figure 2 also depicts a
sample patternmatching statemachine.
TABLE 3 : COMPARISON OF VARIOUS HARDWARE-BASED STRING MATCHING PERFORMANCE SOLUTIONS
Figure. 2. Pattren matching  state machine
Authors Approach Platform Number of 
Patterns  
Pattern Length Throughput 
Gbps
Jung Bit-Split FPGA 1316 No limit 1.76
Vasiliadies AC-DFA GPU 4000 <25 2.3
Lunteren B_FSM FPGA 8000 No limit 2.2
Scarpazza AC-DFA Cell/B.E 8400 <10 2.5
E Yang Field Merge FPGA 6944 <64 4.56
Song CDFA ACIS 1785 No limit 6.1
Jiang Depth-Bounded Pipeline FPGA 9033 No limit 11.4
Hoang Leaf-attaching FPGA 10856 <64 11.8
Figure 4. Packet Classification process.
